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TEXAS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACT
THE TEXAS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACT
Helen Wood*
B ECAUSE a motor vehicle is an easily movable chattel and
is often the subject of successive security transactions, it
has frequently been the subject matter of fraud. The increasing
number of automobiles has made it imperative that rights relating
to ownership and security interests be clearly and carefully
defined. To meet the situation and to assure better protection to
lien holders and innocent purchasers, the Texas Legislature en-
acted the Certificate of Title Act' in 1939. It is a penal statute
designed to govern every transaction in the life of a motor
vehicle from the time it is first offered for sale until it is junked.
It regulates sales and the manner of evidencing liens and provides
a means of complete identification of the vehicle.
The intent and public policy, as declared in the Act, is "to
lessen and prevent the theft of motor vehicles and house trailers,
and the importation into this State of, and traffic in, stolen motor
vehicles and house trailers, and the sale of encumbered motor
vehicles and house trailers without the enforced disclosure to the
purchaser of any and all liens for which any such motor vehicle
or house trailer stands as security, and the provisions hereof,
singularly and collectively, are to be liberally construed to that
end."2 It is a penal statute, but it sets out in detail the effect of
non-compliance on civil rights and liabilities. Though therd are
penalty provisions for violations, the statute is obviously more
than a mere police measure.
*B.A., B.B.A., University of Texas; LL.B., Southern Methodist University; member
of the Texas bar.
1 Tex. Acts 1939, p. 602, amended, Acts 1941, c. 187 and Acts 1947, chs. 105, 174;




CONTENTS OF THE ACT
The Act provides that applications for certificates are to be
made through the tax collector's office in the county of the appli-
cant's domicile, and certificates are issued by and under authority
of the Texas State Highway Department. The three documents
defined in the statute are "certificate of title," "manufacturer's
certificate," and "importer's certificate." In order to determine
when each of these documents is required, it is necessary to
observe carefully the statutory definition of terms, such as "own-
er," "importer," "new car," "used car," "first sale," and "subse-
quent sale."
When a new car is originally shipped and sold by a manufac-
turer to a Texas dealer, a manufacturer's certificate is the proper
document on the car. No application for a certificate of title need
be made unless and until the automobile is transferred to an
"owner." An "owner" is defined as "any person, firm, association,
or corporation other than a manufacturer, importer, distributor,
or dealer claiming title to, or having a right to operate pursuant
to a lien on a motor vehicle after the first sale as herein defined." 3
An "owner" is the ultimate consumer or user of an automobile;
he is the one who purchases an automobile for his own personal
use. The term specifically excludes manufacturers or dealers. As
long as the automobile is in the hands of a manufacturer, dis-
tributor, or dealer, a manufacturer's certificate is the only docu-
ment required. A manufacturer's certificate is defined as an instru-
ment "showing original transfer of a new motor vehicle from the
manufacturer to the original purchaser, whether importer, dis-
tributor, dealer, or owner, and when presented with an applica-
tion for certificate of title must show thereon, on appropriate
forms to be prescribed by the Department, each subsequent trans-
fer between distributor and dealer, dealer and dealer, and dealer
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on a form prescribed by the State Highway Department, and it
should be transferred with each "first sale." The statutory defini-
tion of "first sale" is a "bargain, sale, transfer or delivery within
this State with intent to pass an interest therein, other than a lien of a
motor vehicle which has not been previously registered or licensed
in this State. '"" Any transfer from manufacturer to dealer, dealer
to dealer, or from dealer to "owner" constitutes a "first sale" if
the automobile is not yet required to be registered.' Thus, the
term "first sale" includes every transfer beginning with the manu-
facturer to his transferee and all subsequent transfers including
the first transfer to an owner or ultimate consumer. When the
automobile gets into the hands of an owner, it is for the first time
necessary to apply for a certificate of title. Successive "first sales"
may occur in Texas, but registration of the automobile is not
required until title is to pass to an "owner." At the time of regis-
tration the "owner" should have in his possession the manufac-
turer's certificate, showing all previous first sales and showing the
applicant to be the last transferee. He is required to present the
manufacturer's certificate with his application for a certificate of
title.
According to a recent Texas civil appeals case,7 the analysis
in the preceding paragraph applies only where an automobile is
originally shipped and sold by a manufacturer to a Texas dealer
and all transfers before registration are Texas transactions. If a
car is originally shipped and sold to a dealer or distributor out-
side of Texas and then, before registration, imported by a Texas
dealer for sale, the law may be different. In this instance, an im-
§ 7. In defining "first sale" this section uses the phrase "within this State," but
Section 10 indicates that a "first sale" may take place outside of Texas as well as within
Texas.
6 The transfer of a second-hand car to a dealer constitutes a "subsequent sale" if
the vehicle is one which has been or should have been previously registered; the seller
is required to transfer to the dealer an assigned certificate of title. Texas Automotive
Dealers Ass'n v. Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector . ------- Tex....... , 229 S. W.
2d 787 (1950), rev'g on other grounds 225 S. W. 2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
7 State Highway Department v. Texas Automotive Dealers Ass'n, 239 S. W. 2d 662
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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porter's certificate, in lieu of a manufacturer's certificate, seems
to be required for registration. An importer means "any person,
except a manufacturer, who brings any used motor vehicle into
this State for the purpose of sale within this State."' (Emphasis
added.) The Act declares: "No such designated agent shall issue
a receipt for a certificate of title to any used motor vehicle im-
ported into this State for the purpose of sale within this State
without delivery to him by the applicant of an importer's certifi-
cate properly assigned by the importer upon a form to be pre-
scribed by the Department."9 (Emphasis added.) The statutory
definition of the word "used" causes difficulty in the interpretation
of the sections pertaining to importation, particularly since a
manufacturer's certificate is a document required for a vehicle
which is a "new car." The term "used car" is defined as a "motor
vehicle that has been the subject of a first sale whether within
this State or elsewhere."' In other words, any car which has been
the subject of a first sale becomes a "used car," though it has
never been transferred to an owner or consumer. The manufac-
turer, then, is the only person who does not handle a "used"
vehicle. Anyone, other than the manufacturer himself, who brings
a car into Texas for sale would be handling a "used" vehicle and
is an importer; and an importer's certificate should be obtained.
An applicant for a certificate of title is required to present the
importer's certificate properly assigned to him.
From the foregoing analysis it appears that imported and non-
imported cars are treated differently.' It seems that a car is non-
imported if it is brought to Texas by the manufacturer himself
and all transfers before registration are strictly Texas transac-
tions. In this instance the Department requires registration on the
basis of a manufacturer's certificate for a "new car." The statu-
tory definition of "new car" is "a motor vehicle which has never
s§ 17.
5§ 29. The "designated agent" means the local tax collector.
10 § 10.
11 See case cited supra note 7.
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been the subject of a first sale."12 Yet it appears that if all trans-
fers prior to registration take place in Texas, a car does not be-
come a "used" vehicle until it is transferred to an "owner." There
may be several first sales in Texas, but a car does not lose its
status as a "new car" if the interest passes in Texas and no "own-
er" takes title. On the other hand, a vehicle becomes a "used car"
if the passing of an interest takes place outside of Texas, under
the sections pertaining to importation, even though there is no
"owner." In this instance, registration is based on an importer's
certificate for a "used car."
If any person, other than a manufacturer or importer, brings
a vehicle into the state, a certificate of title is the proper document
to be obtained before the car may be sold or encumbered.'
Another important term defined in the Act is "subsequent sale."
It has been seen that a "first sale" means a transfer of a vehicle
which has not previously been registered. The term "subsequent
sale" means a transfer of a vehicle after it has been registered.
The statutory definition of "subsequent sale" is "the bargain, sale,
transfer or delivery within this State, with intent to pass an inter-
est therein, other than a lien of a motor vehicle which has been
registered or licensed within this State or when it has not been
required under law to be registered or licensed in this State. 14
Any sale after registration is a "subsequent sale," as distinguished
from a "first sale" or any sale prior to registration. Since the
final "first sale" to an owner compels registration, any sale there-
after made by an owner or later transferee is a "subsequent sale."
This distinction is material because of the rule laid down by the
Act that an application for a certificate of title is essential to the
validity of a "subsequent sale." Thus, the first owner of an auto-
mobile should apply for a certificate of title, and he should trans-
fer his certificate of title when and if he sells the car. Failure to





vents a vendee from acquiring legal title.15 On the other hand,
failure to transfer a manufacturer's certificate in a "first sale"
transaction does not make a "first sale" void,16 but the purchaser
should secure a manufacturer's certificate in order to avail him-
self of protection under the Act. Moreover, presentation of the
manufacturer's certificate is a condition precedent to the right to
receive a certificate of title.
It seems clear, from the language used in the statute, that an
application for a certificate of title is a condition precedent to
the right to transfer a vehicle in a "subsequent sale." The Act
provides: "Before selling or disposing of any motor vehicle re-
quired to be registered or licensed in this State on any highway
or public place within this State, except with dealer's metal or
cardboard license number thereto attached as now provided by
law, the owner shall make application to the designated agent in
the county of his domicile upon form to be prescribed by the
Department for a certificate of title for such motor vehicle." 17
The Act further declares that no motor vehicle may be disposed
of at a "subsequent sale" unless the owner shall make "an affi-
davit to the effect that the signer is the owner of the motor vehicle,
and that there are no liens against such motor vehicle, except
such as are shown on the certificate of title and no title to any
motor vehicle shall pass or vest until such transfer be so exe-
cuted."" This prohibits a "subsequent sale" without the required
15 See Reeb v. Danley, 221 S. W. 2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Gregory v. Laird,
212 S. W. 2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Fulcher v. Hall, 170 S. W. 2d 321 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942) ; Giles v. Lehman, 163 S. W. 2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Elder Chevrolet
Co. v. Bailey County Motor Co., 151 S. W. 2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
16 See Motor Investment Co. v. City of Hamlin, 142 Tex. 486, 179 S. W. 2d 278 (1944),
rev'g 177 S. W. 2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ; Motor Investment Co. v. Knox City,
141 Tex. 530, 174S. W. 2d 482 (1943), af'g 169 S. W. 2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
17 § 27.
18 § 33. This section requires only "owners" to transfer before a notary public in
order to consummate a "subsequent sale." Dealers are not required to apply for a new
certificate of title when they purchase a previously registered car; they may transfer
the same certificate of title which was transferred to them, by merely endorsing the
back of the certificate (no affidavit required). Texas Automotive Dealers Ass'n v. Harris
County Tax Assessor-Collector -............-Tex ---------, 229 S. W. 2d 787 (1950), rev'g 225
S. W. 2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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execution of transfer before a notary public, and indicates that
failure to obtain a certificate of title will prevent a vendee from
acquiring legal title. Furthermore, it is made unlawful to sell or
execute a contract lien on a vehicle registered or licensed in the
state without having in possession the proper receipt or certificate
of title covering the vehicle. 9 It is also made unlawful to buy or
acquire any title, other than a lien, to any vehicle registered or
licensed in the state, without demanding of the seller the registra-
tion receipt or certificate of title.
The term lien is defined as "every kind of lease, conditional
sales contract, deed of trust, chattel mortgage, trust receipt, reser-
vation of title, or other written instrument of whatsoever kind
or character whereby an interest, other than absolute title, is
sought to be held or given in a motor vehicle, also any lien
created or given by Constitution or Statute. ' 20 It is to be noted
that this expressly covers constitutional and statutory liens as well
as contractual liens.
The notation of a lien on a certificate of title has about the
same effect as that of filing an ordinary chattel mortgage with
the county clerk. It is definitely settled that the Act repealed and
superseded the civil statutes relating to chattel mortgages in so
far as they affected contract liens on motor vehicles.21 Registra-
tion in the county clerk's office no longer furnishes constructive
notice to innocent purchasers and subsequent lien holders.2" The
19 The term "receipt" is a written acknowledgment from the local tax collector of
having received an application for certificate of title, and authorizes operation of the
vehicle for 10 days.
20 § 3.
21 See Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S. W. 2d 843 (1950), rev'g 221
S. W. 2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Motor Investment Co. v. City of Hamiin, 142 Tex.
486, 179 S. W. 2d 278 (1944), rev'g 177 S. W. 2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ; Christian
v. Boyd, 222 S. W. 2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Hill v. Wolfe, 184 S. W. 2d 489 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1944) er. ref. w.o.m.; Dublin National Bank v. Chastain, 167 S. W. 2d 795(Tex. Civ. App. 1942) er. ref.; Commercial Credit Co. v. American Mfg. Co., 155 S. W.
2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) er. ref.; Clade v. National City Bank of Waco, 229 S. W.
2J- 815 (Tex Civ. App. 1950).
22 See San Jacinto Finance Corp. v. Kelley, 239 S. W. 2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951);
Christian v. Boyd, 222 S. W. 2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Higgins v. Rohertson, 210
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only constructive notice is by notation of the lien on a valid cer-
tificate of title issued by the Department; but failure to recite
the lien on the certificate does not destroy the lien between the
parties and those having actual knowledge of its existence, even
though it is not registered as required by statute.2" The statute
provides that no lien "shall be valid as against third parties with-
out actual knowledge thereof, or enforceable against the motor
vehicle of any such third parties, unless the notation of said lien
shall have been caused to be made on receipts and certificates of
title on said motor vehicle, as provided in this Act." 4 Liens thus
noted on a certificate of title are enforceable against the world,
and all liens take priority according to the order of time they
appear on the title certificate. Liens are noted on a certificate at
the time it is issued. If a lien is created after issuance of a title
certificate, the old certificate must be surrendered and a new one
issued showing the lien. It is the lienor's duty to see that the
mortgagor has complied with these provisions.2" In other words,
a person desiring to fix a valid lien on a motor vehicle must see
that the lien is endorsed on the certificate of title. If through his
negligence this is not done, the lien cannot be enforced against
a vehicle in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. When
the lien has been satisfied, the mortgagor can procure a new cer-
tificate of title by presenting the old certificate and an affidavit
acknowledging that the lien has been discharged.
Manufacturer's and dealer's liens are noted on the manufac-
turer's certificate. The Act provides: "No lien shall be valid on
any motor vehicle which is hereafter the subject of a first sale,
S. W. 2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e.; Commercial Credit Co. v. American
Mfg. Co.,'155 S. W. 2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) er. ref.
23 See cases cited supra note 22. C1. Clynch v. Bowers, 164 S. W. 2d 768 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942), where two chattel mortgages were executed on a truck trai!er, and neither
was noted on a certificate of title. The subsequent lienor had no actual or constructive
notice of the existing lien. The court held the lien prior in time prevailed.
24§ 44.
25 Higgins v. Robertson, 210 S. W. 2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e.; see
Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S. W. 2d 843 (1950), rev'g 221 S. W. 2d
297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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or be enforceable against any such motor vehicle unless there is
noted on the importer's or manufacturer's certificate the date,
name and address of the mortgagees whose rights arise out of
or are incident to such first sale by reason of the execution of
any written instrument by the transferee."" If this section is to
be given literal effect, it would invalidate the lien between the
parties and against third parties with actual knowledge unless
there is the required notation of the lien on the manufacturer's
certificate. This construction is doubtful, particularly in view of
the Texas rule that a chattel mortgage lien on personal property
is good between the parties whether registered or not.27
It is further provided: "Only liens noted on a receipt or certifi-
cate of title shall be valid as against creditors of the mortgagor
in so far as concerns the motor vehicle."2 This section renders
all liens void against creditors of the owner, unless they are
noted on the certificate of title. No effect is given to actual knowl-
edge of the creditor of the existence of such liens. The term
"creditor" apparently means any creditor holding a lien by some
process of law. 9
FAILURE TO TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
The case of Elder Chevrolet Co. v. Bailey County Motor Co."0
involved several transactions in which all the parties ignored the
Certificate of Title Act. Plaintiff sold an automobile to Bailey
Company without transferring the certificate of title. A note and
chattel mortgage were executed and delivered, but the chattel
26 § 41.
27 Concerning the construction of Section 41, no case in point has been found. In
Commercial Credit Co. v. American Mfg. Co., 155 S. W. 2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
er. ref., there was dictum to the effect that it is a well-known Texas rule that a chattel
mortgage lien on personal property is good between the parties whether registered or
not.
2s § 46.
29 A broader meaning of the term "creditor" was assumed by the court in In re
Boston, 84 F. Supp. 594, 596 (N. D. Tex. 1949). The assumption was made that the term
included creditors holding a lien either "by contract or some process of law."
80 151 S. W. 2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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mortgage was never recorded. Bailey Company sold the car to a
sub-vendee, who likewise executed a promissory note and chattel
mortgage on the automobile. Again there was no assignment of
certificate of title and no attempt to procure one. Southwestern
Company purchased the note and chattel mortgage executed by
the sub-vendee under Bailey Company. The purchase of this note
was in due course and for value, and there was no notice of
plaintiff's lien. The sub-vendee defaulted, and Southwestern Com-
pany took possession of the car. At the time suit was filed to
foreclose its chattel mortgage, plaintiff held a certificate of title
to the car, reciting no liens.
The motor vehicle involved was a second-hand automobile, and
the sales were "subsequent" sales. The pertinent section of the
Certificate of Title Act is Section 53, which provides: "All sales
made in violation of this Act shall be void and no title shall pass
until the provisions of this Act shall have been complied with."
The court recognized a distinction between a sale and a contract
to sell, and said:
"Of the essence of the sale is the present transfer of title to the prop-
erty to the possessor; of the essence of the contract to sell, the present
passage of title is not contemplated, but same is to pass in the future.
"The transaction of March 18, 1940, between plaintiff and Bailey
County Motor Company was insufficient to vest the title to the 1939
model Ford in Bailey County Company. For this purpose same was
void and ineffective. This does not necessarily mean that it was entirely
void and ineffective. An ineffective attempt to convey may in some
cases be construed as a contract to convey. This transaction, in our
opinion, was sufficient to bind the plaintiff so far as in its power to take
initial steps necessary to enable Bailey County Motor Company to
obtain a certificate of title. Surrender of the physical possession of the
car to that company was not forbidden by the Act. Possession of the
car was security for the performance of the obligation of the plaintiff.
This obligation plaintiff has never performed, never offered to per-
form."' 1
8 1 Id. at 942.
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The court held that legal title to the automobile never passed
from the plaintiff and said further:
"Rights plaintiff may have as to this motor car, but the right to fore-
close a lien thereon it has not. It may have a right to recover the title
and possession of the car from defendant Bailey County Motor Com-
pany, but such right is subject to an adjustment of equities. The lawful
contract of March 18, 1940, has never been performed by plaintiff.
Without performance or tender of performance it cannot recover
thereon .''32
The court awarded possession of the car to Southwestern Com-
pany. This right to possession was a succession to the rights of
plaintiff's vendee, Bailey Company, and of the sub-vendee under
Bailey Company. The sub-vendee never had title to the car. He
had the right against his vendor, Bailey Company, to have a
valid title transferred to him, subject to the mortgage. He also
had the right as against Bailey Company to hold possession until
this right had been realized, though this right would not include
the right to operate the car on public roads. The Southwestern
Company was a holder in due course and had the right to en-
force the note, but the chattel mortgage was another matter. The
sub-vendee abandoned possession of the car to his vendor, Bailey
Company, which in turn delivered it to its assignee, Southwestern
Company.
A significant illustration of the right of a non-complying pur-
chaser to possession is found in Manning v. Miller."3 A dealer
bought a second-hand automobile and paid the full purchase price
without securing an assignment of the certificate of title. The
court held the dealer to be entitled to possession even though he
did not comply with the Certificate of Title Act. When the owner
took the automobile without the dealer's knowledge or consent, it
became a stolen car. The court said:
32 1d. at 943.
83 206 S. W. 2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e.
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"The fact that Miller stole his own automobile does not prevent this
automobile from being stolen. Art. 1416, Subd. 4, Vernon's P. C., pro-
vides that one may be guilty of stealing his own property where the per-
son so deprived of possession is, at the time of taking, lawfully entitled
to possession as against the true owner. ' '13
The construction of Section 53 made in the Elder Chevrolet
case, supra, was well expressed in a later case, Hicksbaugh Lum-
ber Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York: 5
"Section 53 of the Act provides that all sales made in violation of the
Act shall be void and that no title (emphasis ours) shall pass until the
provisions of the Act have been complied with. The Act does not pro-
vide that no interest (emphasis ours) in the motor vehicle shall pass
until the provisions of the Act have been complied with.
36
The rule, then, seems to be that where a purchaser in a "sub-
sequent sale" transaction does not procure an assignment and
transfer of the certificate of title, he does not get legal title, but
he has a right to possession and a right to have the seller obtain
title and transfer it to him. The purchaser acquires an equitable
interest in the vehicle, and the seller is no longer the sole owner.
There is a limitation on this rule which requires that no fraud
be connected with the transaction. This limitation was demon-
strated in the case of Fulcher v. Hall,7 where there was another
series of purported sales involving a second-hand automobile. No
certificate of title was issued, and legal title remained in the
original seller. One purchaser had no funds in the bank at the
time he gave a check for the purchase price, and his check was
dishonored. The court held that since he obtained possession of
the car by fraud, he was never lawfully entitled to it. He never
acquired any title, either legal or equitable; and the seller had
a right to rescind the contract. Apparently the purchaser was un-
able in this case to pass any title to subsequent parties.
341 d. at 167.
85 177 S. W. 2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
3 Id. at 803.
87 170 S. W. 2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
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The case of Reeb v. Danley" is to be distinguished. Here plain-
tiff purchased a pick-up truck without procuring an assignment
and transfer of the certificate of title. Plaintiff's mortgagee, a
third party, promised that he would take care of the transfer of
title, but plaintiff's vendor neglected to apply for a certificate of
title. The purchase price of the truck was $600. Plaintiff used it
for over ten months and caused such wear and tear that its value
at the time of trial had depreciated to $40. When he discovered
he could not get license plates, he decided to repudiate the con-
tract. He filed suit to set aside the contract and to recover the
purchase price. The court refused relief and said:
"When appellee purchased this automobile and in effect paid $600
cash for it without either a certificate of title or a receipt from the local
designated agent (County Tax Collector) he entered into not only a
void contract but also an illegal contract. If we should here permit him
to maintain this suit and set aside this illegal contract, and after adjust-
ing equities, to recover the purchase price paid by him, we would be
giving effect to an illegal contract. This we cannot do, but on the con-
trary, this court will leave the parties in the position in which they have
placed themselves.
"We are well aware of the rule that the courts will in some instances
give relief under an illegal contract where it is executory, and the par-
ties are not in pari delicto. Here we think the contract is executed and
the parties are in pari delicto.' 9
The court said the seller violated Sections 33 and 51, and the
purchaser violated Section 52; and both were in pari deFcto. The
seller did not have in his possession at the time of sale a proper
certificate of title covering the truck, as required in Section 51;
he did not transfer a certificate of title, together with an affidavit
to the effect that he was owner of the vehicle and that there were
no liens against it, as provided in Section 33. The purchaser did
not demand of the seller a certificate of title or receipt covering
the vehicle and have it transferred to him upon the form pro-
38 221 S. W. 2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
39 Id. at 582
1951]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
vided by the Department, as required in Section 52. The court
pointed out that the violations are misdemeanors and punishable
by fine.
The court cited Fulcher v. Hall, supra, and intimated that if
the purchaser had acted promptly, he might have had the right
to disaffirm the contract and recover the money paid by him. But
here the period during which he delayed asserting his rights
was unreasonable.
GIFTS
In Hoskins v. Carpenter" it was held that a gift of an automo-
bile is a "subsequent sale," as defined in the Certificate of Title
Act. In this case a decedent had delivered the keys to an auto-
mobile to plaintiff and had transferred the certificate of title.
The certificate was signed by decedent, but there was no affidavit,
as required by the statute. In holding that no title passed, the
court said:
"The attempted transfer of this automobile was a 'subsequent sale'
of the automobile in question, within the meaning of Section 8, Cer-
tificate of Title Act, Vernon's Annotated Penal Code, Art. 1436-1. Sec-
tion 33 of the above-cited article of the Penal Code provides in substance
that no title passes unless the certificate is transferred before a Notary
Public. This transfer was not before a Notary Public, hence it is thought
elementary that title to the automobile did not pass. Mrs. Hoardley being
under no legal obligation to transfer the title, appellant acquired no
rights in the vehicle. It was an unexecuted gift. This is true even though
by the delivery of the keys and certificate Mrs. Hoardley had intended
to convey the title to appellant. The verdict, however, was that she did
not so intend.."41
The case of Wise v. Cain42 involved another purported gift.
Here a donor of an automobile did not personally appear before
a notary public to execute the affidavit of transfer of the certifi-
cate of title, but he gave it to the donee and instructed her to
40 201 S. W. 2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e.
41 Id. at 608.
42 212 S. W. 2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. nr.e.
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have it notarized. In a suit brought by the donor to cancel the
certificate of title, the question for litigation was whether the
false certificate of the notary rendered the gift executory. The
court distinguished Hoskins v. Carpenter, supra, where the cer-
tificate of title was not notarized at all. In the principal case the
donor was estopped to question the proper execution and validity
of the certificate and was held to have made a completed gift.
The court said:
"It is of course true that to constitute a notarial certificate to an
affiadavit valid, the affiant must appear personally before the notary;
absent which the certificate is false, and its execution a criminal offense,
not 9',, on the part of the notary, but on that of those participating in
the commission of the crime. Certainly Wise was as much particeps
criminis to the false certificate as was Mrs. Cain. We do not condone in
any sense her action or that of the notary. We merely hold that Wise
was not in position to question the validity of the certificate. He could
not take advantage of his own wrong, nor invoke equitable or legal aid
to cancel the certificate. '" 4 3
ESTOPPEL
It is a well established rule of personal property that where
one clothes another with indicia of ownership, he may be estopped
to assert title to the property as against a purchaser from one
having such indicia of title. In Erwin v. Southwestern Investment
Co." the supreme court held that possession of an incomplete
certificate of title without possession of the automobile did not
constitute such a clothing with indicia of title. In this case a
second-hand automobile dealer agreed to sell a car owned by the
plaintiff. Plaintiff signed his name to the blank transfer on back
of the certificate of title, without filling in the name of the trans-
feree, and delivered it to the dealer. He refused to comply with
the dealer's request to have it notarized, stating that when the
sale was made, he would then make the necessary affidavit. The
4 Id. at 882.
44 147 Tex. 260, 215 S. W. 2d 330 (1948), aff'g 213 S. W. 2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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dealer later applied to defendant for a loan on the car, though
he did not yet have possession of it. He exhibited the incomplete
certificate of title, falsely representing that he owned the car and
had purchased it from the plaintiff. Defendant granted the loan
and instructed a stenographer to fill in the name and address of
the dealer as the transferee and to sign the notary's certificate
showing that plaintiff appeared before her and made the affidavit.
Although plaintiff was known to the defendant, he was not con-
sulted. The stenographer signed the certificate in her official ca-
pacity as notary public, but did not impress her seal. When the
dealer subsequently defaulted and disappeared, defendant took
possession of the car and obtained a new certificate of title from
the State Highway Department. In an action brought for conver-
sion of the automobile, the court of civil appeals rendered a
judgment upon the ground that plaintiff had invested the dealer
with apparent title by delivering to him the certificate of title
signed in blank and was estopped to deny that the mortgagee had
acquired good title. The supreme court reversed this judgment,
saying:
"All persons dealing with Dunn were legally put on notice of the
defect in his title, even assuming that the facts represented falsely by
him were true. Section 51 expressly made it unlawful for Dunn to offer
the automobile as security for any obligation without having the prop-
erly executed certificate, and persons dealing with him were charged
with notice of the illegality of his conduct in so doing, although under
Section 52 it was not necessary for a person acquiring a lien to secure
a transfer of title. We do not think it can properly be said that Erwin
had invested Dunn with all the indicia of title; on the contrary, a legally
essential indicium of title, to wit, a properly executed transfer of title
certificate, had both actually and apparently been withheld from Dunn
by Erwin.
"A person dealing with the holder of an incomplete transfer of a cer-
tificate of title is ordinarily in no position to plead estoppel against the
true owner.
' 4
45 215 S. W. 2d at.332.
[Vol. 5
TEXAS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACT
The essential requirements for estoppel were held to be lack-
ing. The court said:
. "The fact that the notary's seal was not impressed on the document
is immaterial here. The point is that respondent's agent did not rely on
any appearance of title or authority which Dunn had through possession
of the certificate of title with the incomplete transfer; he realized its
insufficiency and undertook to supply its deficiencies by making out a
false certificate. The respondent therefore showed neither good faith
reliance on anything done by Erwin nor the equitable conduct on its
own Dart which are both essential before estoppel can be successfully
raised."46
The case of Wise v. Cain, supra, was mentioned, and the court
pointed out that the holding in the principal case does not mean
that estoppel can never arise against a claim that a transfer of a
title certificate has not been properly executed.
NOTATION OF LIENS ON CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
It has already been shown that registration in the county clerk's
office of chattel mortgages on motor vehicles is no longer con-
structive notice to innocent purchasers and subsequent lienors4 7
Liens noted on a certificate of title are constructive notice to the
world. Failure to recite a lien on a certificate of title does not
destroy the lien between the parties and those having actual notice
of its existence.4" It is the lienor's duty to see that there is com-
pliance with these provisions, and a non-complying lienor will
not be protected.49 The lienor's duty was expressed in Higgins v.
Robertson" as follows:
46 Id. at 333.
47 See cases cited supra note 22.
4s See cases cited supra notes 22 and 23.
49 In a federal case a dealer in second-hand automobiles made an arrangement to
borrow purchase money, and the cars were to be subject to liens for such advancements.
The certificates of title were turned over to the lender, but she recorded no lien of any
sort. When a car was sold, the proceeds, so far as applicable, were to be turned over
to her. The dealer issued affidavits of loss of certificates to purchasers, and sought to
have the Highway Department issue certificates of title to them. The dealer filed a vol.
untary petition in bankruptcy, and the referee enjoined the Department from issuing
the certificates. The court overruled the referee and said the duty of the Department
1951]
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"A reasonable interpretation of the Act and common prudence make
it the duty of a lien holder to see that the mortgagor has complied with
the State Certificate of Title law in order to protect his lien as well as
to protect innocent purchasers. If the lien holder is derelict in his duty,
he suffers the consequences as a result of his own negligence.""
The lienor's duty is merely to see that the lien is noted on the
certificate or application. If there is a subsequent forgery, the
lienor will be protected. This principle was invoked in Dublin
National Bank v. Chastain.5" In this case plaintiff bank made
certain that its lien was properly recited in the owner's applica-
tion for certificate of title; it required the owner "to sign and
swear to an application for a certificate of title in which it was
shown that the Dublin National Bank held a lien against said
automobile."53 The owner subsequently altered the application so
that it failed to show plaintiff's lien. He also altered the manu-
facturer's certificate by erasing his name and writing a fictitious
name. He then sold the automobile to defendant. The court held
plaintiff's lien to be enforceable, though unregistered. The
court said:
"The provision of Section 44 is: 'No lien on any motor vehicle to
which a receipt or certificate of title has been issued shall be valid as
against third parties without actual knowledge thereof, or enforceable
against the motor vehicle of any such third parties. unless the notation
of said lien shall have been caused to be made on receipts and certificates
of title on said motor vehicle, ts provided in this Act.' (Italics ours.)
"Under the first clause above italicized if Chastain otherwise had
title to the automobile but had actual knowledge of the bank's lien before
under the Act is largely ministerial rather than discretionary, though there is a pro-
vision in the statute which states that if it should later appear that a certificate is not
lost, the duplicate may be cancelled. The fact that compliance by the Department would
result in loss to the lender was held not to be sufficient reason to command the Depart-
ment not to comply with the statute. The lender was a non-complying lienor; she did
not protect herself by registration of her lien. Her remedy was to pursue the car and
proceed against the person who caused her loss. In re Banks, 69 F. Supp. 227 (N. D.
Tex. 1947).
50 210 S. W. 2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e.
I1 Id. at 253.
52 167 S. W. 2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) er. ref.
58 Id. at 796.
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he became the owner, he would have no defense against the bank's lien.
His situation would have been the familiar one of the purchaser of
property upon which a registered lien exists, the want of registration
being rendered immaterial by his actual knowledge of the lien. In order
to deprive the bank of its lien, even though unregistered, something is
required besides a mere absence of knowledge of the lien. The same act
which requires the registration of the lien requires the registration of
title to the car. Registration acts do not protect a purchaser holding
under a registered title if a link in said title be a forgery. Proof of the
forgery of a link of title is tantamount to proof that the claimant of such
title has none, or in other words, that he is not the owner of the prop-
erty."5
5 4
A similar swindle occurred in Commercial Credit Co. v. Amer-
ican Manufacturing Co.55 Plaintiff owned a purchase-money note
and chattel mortgage lien on the automobile involved. The lien
was properly recited on a Texas certificate of title. The owner of
the automobile took the car out of the state of Texas and fraudu-
lently obtained a Michigan certificate of title showing no liens.
He also put a Michigan license plate on the car. He brought the
car back to Texas and applied for another Texas certificate,
falsely representing that no lien existed against the car. He sold
it to a dealer in second-hand automobiles, who secured a Texas
certificate of title in his own name and a Texas license plate.
The dealer sold the automobile to an innocent purchaser, trans-
ferring his certificate of title. The dealer and his vendee were
defendants in the suit. Neither had any knowledge of the first
Texas certificate, nor of the false representations made in obtain-
ing the Michigan certificate by plaintiff's mortgagor. They had
no constructive notice of plaintiff's lien except as would be im-
puted to them by recitation in the first certificate.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The court
said plaintiff did all the law contemplated he should do. He satis-
fied himself that his lien was recited in the first certificate of
title, and this was notice to the public. The lien continued valid
54 Id. at 797.
-5 155 S. W. 2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) er. rel.
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until the records of the Highway Department showed it satisfied
and a new certificate issued upon authority of that Department.
Defendants could procure no better title than plaintiff's mort-
gagor could convey.
MANUFACTURERS AND DEALERS
In Motor Investment Co. v. Knox City6 a dealer sold an auto-
mobile and transferred the manufacturer's certificate to Hedrick,
who purchased it for the purpose of converting it into a fire
truck and reselling it to a consumer. Hedrick executed a note
and chattel mortgage lien securing his indebtedness for the pur-
chase price. The chattel mortgage was registered in the county
clerk's office, but it was never recited in the manufacturer's cer-
tificate. After converting the automobile into a fire truck, Hedrick
sold and delivered it to Knox City. He exhibited the manufac-
turer's certificate showing no liens, but did not transfer it. Hed-
rick subsequently secured a loan from plaintiff and paid his debt
to his seller. To secure this loan he assigned the manufacturer's
certificate, and the lien was noted in the margin of the certificate.
Plaintiff filed suit to foreclose this lien. The controlling question
was whether title to the truck passed to the city. The court an-
swered the question in the affirmative, and further held the city
to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
The court said Hedrick's vendor was a "dealer" as defined in
Section 19, and Hedrick was either a "manufacturer" as defined in
Section 16 or a "dealer" as defined in Section 19. They there-
fore did not come within the definition of an "owner" claiming
title to a vehicle after first sale, and they were not required under
Sections 27 and 33 to procure a certificate of title before selling
the vehicle. In holding that the transfer of a manufacturer's cer-
tificate is not essential to the validity of a "first sale," the court
construed the pertinent sections as follows:
56 141 Tex. 530, 174 S. W. 2d 482 (1943), aff'g 169 S. W. 2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942). Accord, Nicewarner v. Alston, 228 S. W. 2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) er. ref.
n.r.e.
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,The transfer of the vehicle from Hedrick to the city was not en-
dorsed on the manufacturer's certificate, nor was the certificate deliv-
ered by Hedrick to the city at the time the city acquired the vehicle, but
we find nothing in the Act which prescribes these steps as necessary
prerequisites to the validity of such a sale.
"Sections 22 and 28 of the Act do require the presentment of a manu-
facturer's certificate properly filled out, showing each previous transfer
of the vehicle as a condition precedent to the right to receive a cer-
tificate of title from the State Highway Department, but there is no
provision to the effect that a 'first sale" shall be invalid unless the man-
ufacturer's certificate is transferred and delivered therewith. It is con-
ceivable that one might buy such a vehicle from a dealer without any
intention of ever putting it in operation upon a public highway, and so
long as he did not so use it upon the public highway for purposes other
than mere demonstration, there would be no necessity for the securing
of a certificate of title, and therefore no necessity of presenting to the
Highway Department the manufacturer's certificate properly filled out,
as provided for in Section 22."I7
The facts of Motor Investment Co. v. City of Hamlin"s were
similar to those in the Knox City case, and some of the same parties
were involved. In this case Hedrick's mortgagee properly noted
his lien on the manufacturer's certificate. Hedrick subsequently
converted and sold the vehicle to the City of Hamlin, falsely rep-
resenting that the truck was free of liens and that he would de-
liver the manufacturer's certificate later. The city had no actual
knowledge of the lien at the time it purchased the truck. The
question for decision was whether notation of the lien on the
manufacturer's certificate was the proper means of constructive
notice to the city. This question arose from the argument that
Hedrick was required to procure a certificate of title under Sec-
tion 37(b) in order to fix a lien on the truck in such a way as to be
constructive notice to innocent purchasers.
Section 37(a) pertains to vehicles which have been demolished
37 ld. at 537, 174 S. W. 2d at 486.
58142 Tex. 486. 179 S. W. 2d 278 (1944), rev'g 177 S. W. 2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App.
1943).
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and junked. 9 Section 37(b) requires any person who rebuilds or
assembles a motor vehicle to procure a certificate of title before
operating or selling it; and such person must furnish an affidavit
setting forth where, when and how, and from whom he procured
the various parts used in rebuilding and assembling the vehicle.
It is apparent that if Hedrick's business of converting automo-
biles into fire trucks came within Section 37(b), he was required
to procure a certificate of title, and the proper means of con-
structive notice would be by notation on the certificate of title.
The court held that Section 37(b) applies to one who rebuilds
or assembles motor vehicles by use of parts obtained from pre-
viously used vehicles, and Section 16 applies to one who assem-
bles new vehicles. Hedrick was in the business of manufacturing
and assembling new vehicles, and the court held that he was a
"manufacturer" within Section 16. Therefore he was not required
to procure a certificate of title. His sale to the city was a "first
sale," and the manufacturer's certificate was the proper docu-
ment on which to note the lien in order to furnish constructive
notice. The lien was enforced against the city.
SECURITY INTERESTS IN IMPORTED VEHICLES
In recent litigation concerning security liens on motor vehicles
brought into the state from other jurisdictions, the supreme court
declared a change in the public policy of this state. In Bank of
Atlanta v. Fretz6° an owner in Atlanta, Georgia, executed a bill
of sale and chattel mortgage securing an indebtedness on an auto-
59Section 37(a) states: "When any motor vehicle registered or licensed in Texas
to which a certificate of title has been issued is junked, dismantled, destroyed, or its
motor number changed or the motor vehicle changed in such manner that it loses its
character as a motor vehicle, or in such manner that it is not the motor vehicle described
in such certificate of title, the owner named last in the certificate of title shall surrender
the certificate of title to the Department together with the written consent of the hold-
ers of all unreleased liens noted thereon, and the certificate shall be cancelled on the
records of the Department."
.o 148 Tex. 551, 226.S. W. 2d 843 (1950),-rev'g 221 S. W. 2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949). Accord, Commercial Credit Co. v. Harris, 227 S. W. 2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950).
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mobile. Georgia does not have a certificate of title law, but the
hill of sale and chattel mortgage were duly filed in accordance
with the laws of that state. The automobile was transported to
Texas without the mortgagee's knowledge or consent, and the
mortgagor applied for a Texas certificate of title on false repre-
sentations that no lien existed against the car. He sold the car to
a Texas innocent purchaser and assigned his application for a
Texas certificate of title. The Texas vendee obtained a certificate
of title, reciting no liens, in his own name; and he sold the car
to a Texas sub-purchaser, who was also an innocent purchaser
for value. The question for litigation was whether a duly recorded
chattel mortgage lien, acquired in Georgia, was enforceable
against a Texas innocent purchaser for value, to whom a certifi-
cate of title had been issued reciting no liens. The court answered
the question in the affirmative, and enforced the lien against the
Texas purchaser. The court held that a lien acquired and properly
recorded in another state is notice to a Texas purchaser and
subsequent lienor.
In the instant case the supreme court expressly overruled the
doctrine of Consolidated Garage v. Chambers6' and Farmer v.
Evans, 2 that where mortgaged property is brought to Texas from
another state and acquired by an innocent purchaser, the rights
of the innocent purchaser are superior to the out-of-state lienor,
although the lien has been duly filed for record and is valid in
the other state. The court pointed out that the rule established by
these two early decisions has been described in textbooks as the
"Texas doctrine," and is contrary to the almost universal rule.68
61 Ill Tex. 293, 231 S. W. 1072 (1921), aff'g 210 S. W. 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
62 111 Tex. 283, 233 S. W. 101 (1921), afJ'g 192 S. W. 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
63 The court quoted the majority rule from 14 C. J. S., Chattel Mortgages, § 15, p. 607,
as fo!lows: "The weight of authority is to the effect that a mortgage, properly executed
and recorded according to the law of the state where the mortgage is executed and the
property is located, will, if valid there, be held valid even as against creditors and pur-
chasers in good faith in another state to which the property is removed by the morlgagor,
unless the transaction contravenes the statute or settled law or policy nf the forum."
It was.noted that to sustain the foregoing rule, decisions of 23 jurisdictions were cited
in the footnote; in support of the Texas rule only two jurisdictions, Louisiana and
Pennsylvania, were cited (Louisiana has now adopted the majority rule). The court
19511
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In a lengthy opinion the court considered other factors, includ-
ing the radical changes in conditions relating to the use of auto-
mobiles within recent years, and the enactment of the Certificate
of Title Act. The court said:
"The spirit and purpose of this law is to prevent fraud; not to en-
courage it. It was not the intention of the Legislature by this Act to
invalidate liens validly acquired in States which do not have a similar
law, and this is especially true in the event a vehicle covered by a lien
is wrongfully, without the knowledge or consent of the lien holder,
removed from the State where the lien was acquired and brought to
this State, and the owner by false and fraudulent representations obtains
a certificate of title showing that no lien exists against the vehicle, so
that he is thereby enabled to transfer for value without notice of the
lien. If the Legislature had intended this, it could have stated that all
liens acquired in other States not having certificate of title laws would
be forfeited when the vehicle reaches the hands of an innocent pur-
chaser for value in this State.
"If the State of Georgia had a certificate of title law, it would have
been the duty of petitioner to see that its lien was endorsed on the cer-
tificate of title issued in that State. Because the State of Georgia does
not have such a law, valid liens acquired in that State should not be
destroyed by dishonest methods, such as that practiced by Harris in
this instance to obtain a certificate of title in Texas.
"The principles of fairness and commercial expediency support the
rule that protects a mortgagee-who holds a valid lien, which was acquired
in another State, on a vehicle wrongfully removed from that State where
the lien was acquired and brought into this State without the consent
or knowledge of the mortgagee."6 4
The court recognized the duty of a lienor to see that his lien is
endorsed on a certificate of title; but Georgia does not have a
certificate of title law, and a lienor in that state must preserve his
lien in accordance with the laws of that state.65
also pointed out that in some jurisdictions the enforcement of a chattel mortgage lien
rests upon the rule of comity or reciprocity_
64 148 Tex. at 560, 561, 226 S. W. 2d at 849.
SBall Bros. Trucking Co. v. Sorenson, 191 S. W. 2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), is
in accord with the principal case, but it was litigated 5 years before the decision in the
instant case overruled Consolidated Garage v. Chambers and Farmer v. Evans. In this
,case an importer of an automobile executed an importer's certificate and applied for
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The court also held that issuance of a Texas certificate of title,
reciting no encumbrances, does not destroy the lien acquired and
duly recorded in another state. Reference was made to Section 38,
which gives the Highway Department authority to suspend or re-
voke a certificate of title containing false or fraudulent statements.
In Clanton v. Thigpen6 a Tennessee conditional vendor sued
to recover an automobile which his vendee removed to Texas
without his knowledge or consent. The vendee had applied for a
Texas certificate of title by presenting fictitious evidence of own-
ership, and had sold the car to an innocent purchaser. Tennessee
does not have a certificate of title law; the customary method of
conveying title is by bill of sale. A conditional sales contract in
Tennessee is not construed as a mortgage, but it is a valid reten-
tion of title in the vendor. Under Tennessee law it is not required
that such a contract be registered as a chattel mortgage.
The Texas purchaser contended that he was an innocent pur-
C1Lhiser for value and had no notice of a lien, but the court rendered
judgment in favor of the Tennessee conditional vendor. The court
said this case came "squarely" under the rule announced in Bank
of Atlanta v. Fretz, supra, and to support its decision the court
quoted the excerpt set out above in connection with that case.
In the light of Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz and Clanton v. Thigpen,
it is apparent that Texas has finally adopted the rule of the over-
whelming majority. Where a chattel mortgage on a motor vehicle
is recorded in compliance with the laws of the state in which the
lien was acquired, and the vehicle is subsequently removed to
Texas without the mortgagee's knowledge or consent, the mort-
gagee's lien will be preserved against a Texas innocent purchaser.
The recording provisions in the Texas Certificate of Title Act are
inapplicable to the preservation of the out-of-state lien. Also
where a conditional sale contract takes place in a state which does
a Texas certificate of title, falsely representing that the vehicle was free of liens. The
court imposed a duty on the purchaser or lender on an imported vehicle to see to it
that the importer had complied with the Texas Certificate of Title law.
66 226 S. W. 2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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not require recording, the conditional vendor's title will be recog-
nized as superior to that of a Texas innocent purchaser. This is in
line with the common law rule that, in absence of recording
statutes, a conditional vendor's title will be protected, although
the conditional vendee has transferred the property to an innocent
purchaser for value without notice.
CONCLUSION
The cases involving the Certificate of Title Act indicate on the
whole a sympathetic attitude on the part of the courts in constru-
ing the statute, in order to protect complying parties and.in order
to effectuate the purpose of the Act. Dicta in many cases show a
recognition by the courts that this statute was enacted for the
benefit of the public, and courts have sometimes refused to give
literal effect to language used in the statute in order to effectuate
the purpose for which it was enacted.
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